approach.
for Secular Feminist Analyses of Religion Introduction
In recent years, the 'lived religion' approach has gained momentum within the sociology of religion. This approach developed as a critique of the limitations posed by analyses of religion which foreground institutions and organisations rather than 'the actual experience of religious persons' in everyday contexts (McGuire, 2008: 12;  see also Hall, 1997; Orsi, 2003; Ammerman, 2007; Neitz, 2011) . 'Lived religion' opens up a discussion of what religion is: is it a fixed, coherent set of prescriptions about belief and behaviour that are clearly formulated by religious institutions and 'copied' by individuals, or do people have an active and reflexive role in shaping, negotiating and changing their own religious convictions and practices? Importantly, a 'lived religion' approach does not preclude the analysis of institutional forms of religion and individuals' engagement with them. As McGuire argues (2008: 98) , individuals' lived religious practice may be 'closely linked with the teachings and practices of an official religion'. However, the power and meaning of institutional forms of religion in individuals' lives must be studied empirically and not be taken as given. Furthermore, the lived religion approach does not assume that religion is simply a private or individual phenomenon in modern society. As Neitz states (2011: 54) , 'It [lived religion] is often practiced in public or in collective acts and understandings'. An empirical claim that religion only exists in private or individual forms would deny the power and influence of institutional forms of religion.
Moreover, a normative claim that religion ought to be expressed only in the private domain is problematic as it overlooks that religion is at its heart 'communicative and public' (Woodhead, 2013: 96) . Seemingly 'private' forms of individual prayer express social engagement, as argued by Orsi (2003: 173) , and caring for others is at the centre of the lives of many religious people (Nyhagen and Halsaa, 2016) . Religion can thus never simply be private; it is always linked to the social contexts in which individuals live and act, and gives adherents a sense 'of moral direction, of conviction, of belonging' that is ultimately social (Woodhead, 2013: 96) . The 'lived religion' approach is thus embedded in larger normative debates about the role of religion in the public and private spheres.
What are the implications of the lived religion approach for a feminist analysis of religion? Feminists who work to reform religious traditions from within reject the idea that religions are by necessity patriarchal, and in many religious contexts women have made significant advances towards gender equality despite remaining obstacles and challenges (Gross, 1996) . Many feminist studies of religion highlight religion's dual potential to empower and oppress women (e.g. Fournier, 2014; Scott, 2009; Braidotti, 2008; Fessenden, 2008; Sands, 2008; Braude, 2004 ; see also Burke, 2012 for a useful overview). Some scholars show that women's agency and empowerment is also visible within conservative religious contexts (e.g. Mahmood, 2005; Avishai, 2008; Zion-Waldoks, 2015) , thus suggesting that agency can be expressed in submission and religious piety as well as in overt oppositional practices that contest men's power and gender inequalities. In this article, however, the main focus is on implications of the sociological 'lived religion' approach for secular feminist analyses of religion in Western contexts. Inspired by a call for sociology to be normatively engaged in people's everyday worlds (Sayer, 2000) , this article is primarily a normative intervention in the Western debate about women, religion and secularism.
As such, it is a contribution to a feminist sociology of religion that favours an open rather than a pre-determined view of what 'religion' is and means to women. It is also a call for a feminist sociology of religion that is empirically grounded in women's lives and that adopts an intersectional perspective (Appelros, 2005; Weber, 2015) on religious women's identities and the barriers and opportunities they experience for belonging and participation.
The article starts out by proposing three different Western secular feminist positions on religion; a hard, a mixed hard and soft, and a soft position, before reviewing relevant literature on feminism, secularism and religion and identifying a research gap pertaining to the study of secular women's organisations and religion.
The article moves on to examine empirical examples of claims making on women and religion by select high-profile secular feminist women's organisations in Europe; two secular feminist organisations based in London in the United Kingdom, Women Against Fundamentalism and Southall Black Sisters, which demonstrate mixed and hard secular feminist positions, and the international and Brussels-based secular feminist organisation the European Women's Lobby, which also represents a mixed position. The article also refers to a soft secular feminist intervention in the form of a recent policy initiative (the 'Coventry Statement, 2015' ) by a collection of gender and religion scholars who met at Coventry University in the UK.
i The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of a lived religion approach to the three identified secular feminist positions on religion. Ultimately, the article assesses which secular feminist position is most compatible with a 'lived religion' approach that foregrounds the complexity of the actual lives and experiences of religious women.
Alternative secular feminisms and religion
James Beckford (2003: 33) Cady and Fessenden, 2013; Reilly and Scriver, 2013) . Only secularism can lead to a 'gender paradise' (Thistlethwaite, 2014: 193) if we accept the binary. Moving beyond the binary enables us to see that neither religion nor secularism guarantees gender equality (Scott, 2009 ).
Although the religion-secularism binary is fraught with problems, it is heuristically useful to distinguish between different forms of secularism. In relation to debates about women's rights, religion and secularism in the UK, Aune (2015) has observed a polarisation between two positions, that of 'feminist secularism' (rejecting religion) and that of 'religious inclusion' (accommodating religion). Aune rightly notes that not all secularisms are opposed to religion (2015: 170-71 ), yet employs a categorical opposition between 'feminist secularism' and 'religious inclusion'. A more fluid approach can take inspiration from Kosmin's (2007) notion of a continuum from hard to soft versions of secularism. Secular feminism can reject or be inclusive of religion in different ways, and it is useful to distinguish between a 'hard' secular feminist position that is hostile to all forms of religion in both the public and the private spheres, a mixed 'hard and soft' position that is hostile towards religion in the public sphere but accepts religion in the private sphere, and a 'soft' position which accommodates religion in both the public and private spheres.
A hard secular feminist stance views religion as a patriarchal system of institutionally determined beliefs and practices that are enforced by powerful religious authorities and 'copied' by adherents who suffer from 'false consciousness'. It follows that a hard secular feminist stance denies religion any role in both the public and private spheres. A proponent of this stance is the secular feminist academic The mixed 'hard and soft' secular feminist approach also views secularism as necessary for gender equality and rejects the role of religion in the public sphere. In contrast with the hard secular feminist position, it accepts that religious faith provides 'authentic' meaning in the lives of individuals. Because religion is strictly a private issue, religious stakeholders cannot claim a legitimate voice in the public sphere. In agreement with the hard secular feminist approach, the mixed view does not recognise the 'communicative and public' (Woodhead, 2013: 96) what the religious feminist scholar Nussbaum (1999: 197) terms 'the intrinsic value of religious capabilities: the ability to search for the good in a religious way' and affords legitimacy and participatory parity (Fraser, 2007) to both secular and religious stakeholders in democratic deliberation (see, e.g., 'the later ' Casanova, 2009 , for similar arguments). It supports dialogic negotiations of issues pertaining to religious freedom and gender equality, as advocated by feminist scholars such as Phillips (2009) and Nussbaum (1999) .
Importantly, a soft secular feminist stance is not blind to institutional forms of religion that promote gender inequality. Instead, it insists that the power of institutional religion, including its relations with gender, is not pre-determined and must be studied empirically in specific contexts. In this regard, Phillips writes that, while individuals should be free to adhere to their religious practices and beliefs, 'individuals should not be forced by religious authorities to accept discriminatory practices ' (2009: 45) . State intervention in religious affairs might be called for to protect individuals from discrimination and harm. But when values and rights collide, it is not a given that one set of rights will overrule other another; 'there is no simple principle, and judgments must be made in a contextual way' (Phillips, 2009: 46) .
Before turning to an analysis of different secular feminist stances taken by select women's organisations in the UK and Europe, the next section discusses relevant scholarly contributions.
Feminism, secularism and religion
It is well known that religious women were prominent in late nineteenth and early twentieth century campaigns for women's rights around the world (e.g., McFadden, 1999) . Much less is known about late twentieth and early twenty-first century feminist and women's organisations' views on religion, and whether they mobilise both secular and religious women. These issues are yet to be comprehensively answered by research. At a general level, Reilly (2011) argues that Anglo-American feminist thinkers have paid scant attention to religion because they view secularization as inevitable in modern society. Similarly, Aune (2015) states that religion has a 'marginal place' in academic and public feminist debates. In the same vein, Braidotti (2008) claims that most (Western) feminists have been and are secular, and distinguishes between a 'mainstream secularist line' and a marginal 'nonsecularist' line. These scholars' views are supported by Žarkov (2015: 5) , who argues that 'mainstream Western feminism has to a large extent adopted secularism'. There is a danger, however, in that broad generalisations about recent and contemporary feminisms as largely secular overlook the role of religious faith in women's sociopolitical activism in different contexts around the world, be they overtly feminist or not (Žarkov, 2015; Smiet, 2015; Llewellyn and Trzebiatowska, 2013) . Religious women mobilize in struggles for women's rights and gender equality both within and outside religious contexts.
There is far more research on how religious women engage with gender equality and women's rights within their own religious contexts than in alternative spaces (e.g., in feminist and women's movements). However, as noted by Aune and Nyhagen (2016) , studies of religious women's political activism emerging since the 1990s demonstrate how religion can both hinder and support women's rights outside of religious contexts. Recent research on religious women's activism focuses in particular on Muslim women in various settings (e.g. Rinaldo, 2014; Aksoy, 2015) .
Some studies show that contemporary religious and secular women are working together in alliance to strengthen claims about women's rights and gender equality, such as in Turkey, where organized Islamist women collaborated with secular feminist women's groups against the headscarf ban (Aksoy, 2015) . Nevertheless, the dearth of studies of intersections between religion (including Christianity and other faiths) and feminist and women's movement activism in Western contexts since the 1960s is striking, as noted also by Braude (2004) . The two most obvious explanations for this lacuna are the assumptions that feminism is and should be based on secularism and that religion is antithetical to feminism (Braude, 2004; Sands, 2008; Braidotti, 2008 Fundamentalism shows that religious and secular women mobilized together in that organization (Dhaliwal and Yuval-Davis, 2014 ; also see below).
While further research is needed on religious women's activism and its links with feminism, there is also a lack of studies of if and how primarily secular feminist organisations engage with religion. In this regard, contributions from three scholars 
Claims-making on women and religion by secular feminist organisations

Women Against Fundamentalism (WAF)
A specific event, the religious fatwa issued against Salman Rushdie after the publication of his novel The Satanic Verses, spurred the establishment of Women Against Fundamentalism in 1989. Although WAF folded in 2012, its work until then was significant (see Dhaliwal and Yuval-Davis, 2014) . WAF was dedicated to campaigning against any type of 'religious fundamentalism', defining it in broad terms as 'modern political movements that use religion to gain or consolidate power, whether working within or in opposition to the state' (Dhaliwal and Yuval-Davis, 2014: 8; see also Connolly and Patel, 2001; Saghal, 1992; Connolly, 1991 uncomfortable with me identifying in any way with any religious identity, because they see religious identity as necessarily being a fundamentalist identity, rather than distinguishing between spirituality and religiosity' (Balchin, 2014: 220 Caribbean people' (Patel, 2014: 61) . Patel also writes that some Muslim feminists left WAF as they worried that the organisation's focus on religious fundamentalism would fuel a 'racist backlash' against Muslims (Patel, 2014: 61) . In their recent anthology about the history of WAF, Sukhwant Dhaliwal and Nira Yuval-Davis (2014: 19) acknowledge these tensions by stating that 'some WAF members wanted to explore religious frameworks, while others pointed to the dangers of travelling this road within a British context in which secular alternatives could be compromised'. women as inferior, subject to control of male members of the family' (Siddiqui, 1991: 80) . In her 1991 article, Siddiqui is critical of author Rana Kabbani and argues that because Kabbani identifies as a Muslim feminist, 'her version of liberation is compromised by the very religion that she accepts is oppressive' (Siddiqui, 1991: 80) .
Southall Black Sisters (SBS)
For Siddiqui, the struggle for women's rights and also the fight against racism must be based on a secular platform that denounces the influence of religion.
In a later article, Siddiqui identifies it as a problem that faith-based women's groups and their calls for 'specific services and initiatives for Muslim women' are given political attention by the UK government (Siddiqui, 2008: 49 It reiterates that government should refrain from consulting with any faith communities and from using any faith-based organisations to deliver public services (see also Patel, 2011a Patel, , 2011b WAF and SBS, 2007: 35) . The argument from WAF and SBS is that only 'progressive secular anti-racist and feminist groups' should be consulted about and/or given a role in public service delivery that targets ethnic minority women, regardless of whether the service users are religious or not (WAF and SBS, 2007: 26) .
The joint submission suggests that both the battle against religious fundamentalism and the fight against racism should be based on a secular political platform (WAF and SBS, 2007: 1) .
The European Women's Lobby (EWL)
The European insisted that religious women should keep their faith private, thus not accepting that religion is fundamentally 'communicative and public' at its core (Woodhead, 2013: 96) . A similar institutional approach that refuses to engage with 'lived religion' can be found within SBS, where feminists have forwarded a hard secular approach that relegates religion to the private sphere. In difference with WAF, however, secular feminists within SBS have uniformly argued that religion itself is universally harmful for women (e.g. Siddiqui, 1991) and that only a hard secular feminism can offer liberation and empowerment for women. The state has thus been called upon to ally itself with secular feminism only, and to reject the voices of religious women.
The EWL, on the other hand, has taken a mixed feminist secular approach. It has recognised the role of religion in individual women's lives and religion's potential for a progressive influence on gender equality. As such, the EWL's stance resonates with a 'lived religion' approach. Fundamentally, however, the EWL also relies on a patriarchal-institutional analysis that views 'religion' as institutionally fixed and coherent, as exercising power over women, and as detrimental to 'women's rights'. A lived religion approach, on the other hand, proposes to examine whether and how religion is used (mostly by men) to subjugate women in specific contexts. Moreover, the EWL (as well as the Council of Europe) has alleged that a wide range of social practices are associated with religion (and not also with secularism), ranging from women choosing unpaid domestic labour over paid labour market jobs, to women being subjected to different physical forms of violence. Similarly to the SBS, the EWL sees secularism as the only guarantor of gender equality, and calls for state intervention in religion also in cases where religious women do not want such interference. The EWL thus signals disrespect for religious women's right to selfdetermination.
WAF, SBS and EWL share an assumption that women's emancipation is inevitably linked with secularism, while women's oppression is unavoidably connected with religion. In this framework, religious women (and men) who live gender equal lives, and who mobilize for women's rights and gender equality both within and outside religious contexts, are silenced and ignored. In contrast, a lived religion approach would ask empirical questions about how religious and secular women actually live their lives and whether and how they understand, resist, reject or embrace notions such as 'women's rights' and 'gender equality'.
A stable dichotomy between the secular/women's liberation and the religious/women's oppression is also enforced by the refusal of secular feminist activists within WAF and SBS to accept that faith has a legitimate role to play in democratic deliberation and policy making. Using Fraser's terminology, to deny religious women a legitimate voice in public debate is an act of misrecognition, a form of status subordination, and 'a serious violation of justice' (Fraser, 2007: 31) .
Together with the claim that religious women are victims and not agents, and the insistence that secular women best represent the interests of all women, the denial of a legitimate role for religion in the public sphere produces a democratic deficit. While feminist sociologists who endorse a 'lived religion' approach have empirically contested the notion that religious women are devoid of agency, a soft secular feminist stance can normatively address this deficit by affording recognition to both religious and secular women. In this regard, Fraser's (2007) concept of 'participatory parity' invokes equal respect, recognition and opportunity for religious and secular women to partake in democratic deliberation. Participatory parity implies that also women for whom gender equality is not a priority must be listened to.
The Coventry Statement was a feminist scholarly reaction against the perceived simplistic and largely negative views of women and religion represented in policy documents issued by the EWL and the Council of Europe. It emphasises religious women's agency and resonates with the lived religion approach which foregrounds individuals' lived religion in everyday contexts. It also affords recognition and legitimacy to the voices of religious women in the public sphere and supports initiatives for dialogue that includes religious women. The Coventry Statement can also be read as an endorsement of a soft secular feminist position that acknowledges a role for religion in both the public and private spheres. It could, however, be argued that it falls short of acknowledging the need for empirical studies of the production, endurance and power of institutional forms of religion. As such, the Coventry Statement emphasizes religious women's agency whilst downplaying the structural religious forces that are central to a hard secular feminist analysis. A soft secular feminist position grounded in a sociological 'lived religion' approach that centres on everyday life religious experiences must also take into account institutional forms of religion and individuals' engagement with them. As suggested above, only a soft secular feminist stance is capable of overcoming the democratic deficit of the hard and mixed secular feminist positions by recognising religious and secular women's voices, supporting parity of participation (Fraser, 2007) in democratic deliberations about equality and difference in specific contexts.
